We propose a poverty measure based on a non trivial balance between the aggregated value of the income gaps of the poor and the headcount ratio of the poor in the population. The new poverty measure extends a previous proposal also based on the exponential mean but with an exclusive focus on the poor sector of the income distribution.
Welfare functions and inequality indices
We consider populations of n ≥ 2 individuals and we briefly review the notions of welfare function and inequality index in the standard framework of averaging functions on the D n domain, with D = [0, ∞). Comprehensive reviews of averaging functions can be found in Fodor and Roubens [22] , Calvo et al. [15] , Beliakov et al. [5] , and Grabisch et al. [25] .
The income distributions in this framework are represented by points x, y ∈ D n . In any case, most of our results hold analogously over different domains, for instance the reduced domain [0, 1] or even the extended domain R.
Notation.
Points in D n are denoted x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), with 1 = (1, . . . , 1), 0 = (0, . . . , 0) . Accordingly, for every x ∈ D , we have x · 1 = (x, . . . , x). Given x, y ∈ D n , by x ≥ y we mean x i ≥ y i for every i = 1, . . . , n, and by x > y we mean x ≥ y and x ̸ = y. Given x ∈ D n , the increasing and decreasing reorderings of the coordinates of x are indicated as x (1) ≤ · · · ≤ x (n) and x [1] ≥ · · · ≥ x [n] , respectively. In particular, x (1) = min{x 1 , . . . , x n } = x [n] and x (n) = max{x 1 , . . . , x n } = x [1] . In general, given a permutation σ on {1, . . . , n}, we denote x σ = (x σ (1) , . . . , x σ(n) ). Finally, the arithmetic mean is denotedx = (x 1 + · · · + x n )/n.
Definition 1 Let A : D
n −→ D be a function. 
A is monotonic if x ≥ y ⇒ A(x)
≥
A is invariant for translations if A(x + t · 1) =
A(x), for all t ∈ D and x ∈ D n . On the other hand, A is stable for translations if A(x+t·1) = A(x) + t, for all t ∈ D and x ∈ D n .
A is invariant for dilations if A(t · x) = A(x), for all t ∈ D and x ∈ D n . On the other hand, A is stable for dilations if A(t · x) = t A(x), for all t ∈ D and x ∈ D
n .
We introduce the majorization relation on D n and we discuss the concept of income transfer following the approach in Marshall and Olkin [26] , focusing on the classical results relating majorization, income transfers, and bistochastic transformations, 
Definition 2
The majorization relation ≼ on D n is defined as follows: given x, y ∈ D n withx =ȳ, we say that
where the case k = n is an equality due tox =ȳ. As usual, we write x ≺ y if x ≼ y and not y ≼ x, and we write x ∼ y if x ≼ y and y ≼ x. We say that y majorizes x if x ≺ y, and we say that x and y are indifferent if x ∼ y.
Another traditional reading, which reverses that of majorization, refers to the concept of Lorenz dominance: we say that x is Lorenz superior to y if x ≺ y, and we say that x is Lorenz indifferent to y if x ∼ y.
Given an income distribution x ∈ D n , with mean incomex, it holds thatx
The majorization is strict,x · 1 ≺ x, when x is not a uniform income distribution. In such case,x · 1 is Lorenz superior to x. Moreover, for any income distribution x ∈ D n with mean incomex it holds that x ≼ (0, . . . , 0, nx), which is strict for x ̸ = 0.
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x =ȳ, and x ∼ y if and only if x and y differ by a permutation. In general, x ≼ y if and only if there exists a bistochastic matrix C (non-negative square matrix of order n where each row and column sums to one) such that x = Cy. Moreover, x ≺ y if the bistochastic matrix C is not a permutation matrix.
A particular case of bistochastic transformation is the so-called transfer, also called T -transformation.
Definition 3 Given x, y ∈ D
n withx =ȳ, we say that y is derived from x by means of a income transfer T, with T (x) = y if, for some pair i, j = 1, . . . , n with x i ≤ x j , we have In general, for the majorization relation ≼ and income distributions x, y ∈ D n withx =ȳ, it holds that x ≽ y if and only if y can be derived from x by means of a finite sequence of income transfers. Moreover, x ≻ y if any of the income transfers is not a permutation.
Definition 4 Let
In relation with the majorization relation ≼, the notions of Schur-convexity (S-convexity) and Schurconcavity (S-concavity) of the function A are defined as follows:
Moreover, the S-convexity (resp. S-concavity) of a function A is said to be strict if x ≺ y implies 
For simplicity, the n-arity is omitted whenever it is clear from the context. Particular cases of averaging functions are weighted averaging (WA) functions, ordered weighted averaging (OWA) functions, and Choquet integrals, which contain the former as special cases. 
Definition 6 Given a weighting vector
The traditional form of OWA functions as introduced by Yager [40] is as follows,
. In [41, 42] the theory and applications of OWA functions are discussed in detail.
The following are two classical results particulary relevant in our framework. The proofs, given here for convenience, are analogous. The first result, see in particular Skala [36] , regards a form of dominance relation between OWA functions, see also Bortot and Marques Pereira [13] .
Proposition 1 Consider two OWA functions
where the case k = n is an equality due to weight normalization.
The next result, which is referred (without direct proof) by Weymark [37] and Chakravarty [16, p. 28] , regards the relation between the weighting structure and the S-convexity or S-concavity of the OWA function, see also Bortot and Marques Pereira [13] . 
We will now review the basic concepts and definitions regarding welfare functions and inequality indices. Certain properties which are generally considered to be inherent to the concepts of welfare and inequality are now accepted as basic axioms for welfare and inequality measures, see for instance Kolm [29, 30] . The crucial axiom in this field is the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, which states that welfare (inequality) measures should be nondecreasing (non-increasing) under income transfers. This axiom translates directly into the properties of S-concavity and S-convexity in the context of symmetric functions on D n . In fact, a function is Sconcave (S-convex) if and only if it is symmetric and non-decreasing (non-increasing) under income transfers, see for instance Marshall and Olkin [26] .
Definition 8 An averaging function
A : D n −→ D is
a welfare function if it is continuous, idempotent, and S-concave. The welfare function is said to be strict if it is a strict averaging function which is strictly S-concave.
Due to monotonicity and idempotency, a welfare function is non decreasing over D n but increasing along the diagonal x = x · 1 ∈ D n , with x ∈ D. Moreover, notice that S-concavity implies symmetry. Due to S-concavity, a welfare function ranks any Lorenz superior income distribution with the same mean as x as no worse than x, whereas a strict welfare function ranks it as better.
Given a welfare function A, the uniform equivalent incomex associated with an income distribution x is defined as the income level which, if equally distributed among the population, would generate the same welfare value, A(x · 1) = A(x). The uniform equivalent concept has been originally proposed by Chisini [17] in the general context of averaging functions, see for instance Bennet et al. [6] . In the welfare context the uniform equivalent income has been considered by Atkinson [4] , Kolm [28] , and Sen [33] and further elaborated by Blackorby and Donaldson [8, 9, 10] and Blackorby, Donaldson, and Auersperg [12] .
Due to the idempotency of A, we obtainx = A(x). Sincex · 1 ≼ x for any income distribution x ∈ D n , S-concavity implies A(x · 1) ≥ A(x) and therefore A(x) ≤x due to the idempotency of the welfare function. In other words, the mean incomē x and the uniform equivalent incomex are related by 0 ≤x ≤x.
We now define the notion of absolute inequality index, introduced by Kolm [29, 30] and developed by Blackorby and Donaldson [9] , Blackorby, Donaldson, and Auersperg [12] , and Weymark [37] . Following Kolm, inequality measures are described as "absolute" when they are invariant for additive transformations (translation invariance).
Definition 9 A function G : D n −→ D is an absolute inequality index if it is continuous, nilpotent, S-convex, and invariant for translations. The absolute inequality index is said to be strict if it is strictly S-convex.
In relation with the properties of the majorization relation discussed earlier, it holds that: over all income distributions x ∈ D n with the same mean incomex, a welfare function has minimum value A(0, . . . , 0, nx), and an absolute inequality index has maximum value G(0, . . . , 0, nx).
In the AKS framework introduced by Atkinson [4] , Kolm [28] , and Sen [33] , a welfare function which is stable for translations induces an associated absolute inequality index by means of the correspondence formula A(x) =x − G(x), see Blackorby and Donaldson [9] . The welfare function and the associated inequality index are said to be ethical, see also Sen [35] , Blackorby, Donaldson, and Auersperg [12] , Weymark [37] , Blackorby and Donaldson [11] , and Ebert [20] .
Definition 10 Given a welfare function
The In the AKS framework, a welfare function A which is stable for both translations and dilations is associated with both absolute and relative inequality indices G and G R , respectively, with
n . In what follows we will omit the term "absolute" when referring to G.
An important class of welfare functions which are stable for translations is that of the generalized Gini welfare functions introduced by Weymark [37] , see also Mehran [31] , Donaldson and Weymark [18, 19] , Yaari [38, 39] , Ebert [21] , Quiggin [32] , Ben-Porath and Gilboa [7] .
Definition 11 Given a weighting vector
and, in the AKS framework, the associated generalized Gini inequality index is defined as
The 
where the coefficients of A c (x) have unit sum, ∑ n i=1 (2(n − i) + 1) = n 2 , and
where the coefficients of G c (x) have zero sum, ∑ n i=1 (n − 2i + 1) = 0. The classical Gini inequality index G c is traditionally defined as
see for instance Bortot and Marques Pereira [13] . In this paper the authors discuss the family of binomial Gini welfare functions C j , j = 1, . . . , n and associated binomial Gini inequality indices G j , j = 1, . . . , n. In particular, it is shown that C 2 and G 2 are proportional to the classical A c and G c , respectively.
Another instance of the AKS correspondence between generalized Gini welfare functions and inequality indices is the S-Gini family introduced by Donaldson and Weymark [18] , and independently by Kakwani [27] as an extension of a poverty measure proposed by Sen [34] , see also Donaldson e Weymark [19] , Yitzhaki [43] , Bossert [14] , and Aaberge [1, 2, 3].
A new poverty measure
In this section we introduce a new poverty measure based on a non trivial balance between the aggregated value of the income gaps of the poor and the headcount ratio of the poor in the population. This poverty measure extends a previous proposal also based on the exponential mean but with an exclusive focus on the poor sector of the income distribution.
The exponential mean is a strict averaging function which is symmetric and stable for translations. It is also decomposable, in the sense that the values associated with any given subset of individuals can each be substituted by their own aggregated value.
Definition 12
The exponential mean F α : D n → D, with parameter α ∈ R, is defined as
for α ̸ = 0, and F α=0 (x) =x.
The continuity of the exponential mean with respect to the parameter α is ensured by
The following is a classical result, see for instance García-Lapresta et al. [24] .
Proposition 3 The exponential mean F α is Sconvex (S-concave) for α ≥ 0 (α ≤ 0) and strictly S-convex (strictly S-concave) for α > 0 (α < 0).
Given an income distribution x ∈ D n and a poverty threshold z ∈ (0, ∞) representing the necessary income to maintain a minimum level of living, the set of poor individuals in the population is identified by (14) and q(x) = #Q(x) is the number of the poor. We define the restricted poor income distribution x p as
where q = q(x). In this way x
n and a poverty threshold z ∈ (0, ∞), the associated income gap distribution g(x) = (g(x 1 ), . . . , g(x n )) is defined by means of the income gap function
The income gap distribution is normalized in the sense that g(x) ∈ [0, 1] for any income x ∈ D and the income gaps of the non poor are null. Focusing on the poor we obtain the restricted poor income gap distribution g(x p ) as
with g(x
should satisfy the following traditional axioms:
• Poverty Focus (PF): For all x, y ∈ D n and z ∈ (0, ∞), if Q(x) = Q(y) = Q and x i = y i for every i ∈ Q, then P (x) = P (y).
• Poverty Monotonicity (PM): For all x, y ∈ D n and z ∈ (0, ∞), if Q(x) = Q(y) = Q and x = y except for x i > y i with i ∈ Q, then P (x) < P (y).
• Transfer Sensitivity (TS): For all x, y ∈ D n and z ∈ (0, ∞), if y is obtained from x by an income transfer among the poor, with x ≻ y, then P (x) > P (y).
• Normalization (N): For all x, y ∈ D n and z ∈ (0, ∞), P (x) = 0 if and only if Q(x) = ∅, that is x i ≥ z for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
• Poverty Symmetry (PS): For all x ∈ D n , z ∈ (0, ∞), and permutations σ on {1, . . . , n}, it holds that P (x σ ) = P (x).
• Replication Invariance (RI): For all x ∈ D n and z ∈ (0, ∞), if y is obtained from x by a replication, that is y = (x, . . . , x) with m copies of the income distribution x for some m ∈ N, then P (y) = P (x).
• Diminishing Transfer Sensitivity (DTS): For all x, y ∈ D n and z ∈ (0, ∞), if Q(x) = Q(y) and y is obtained from x by an income transfer from the poor person with income x i + c to the poor person with income x i , for some c > 0, then the magnitude of decrease in poverty P (x) − P (y) is higher the lower x i .
On the basis of the exponential mean (12) and the income gap function (16) we introduce a new poverty measure depending on the full income gap distribution of the population. A preliminary version of this proposal has been presented in García-Lapresta et al. [23] .
Definition 13
We define the poverty measure P α :
which means
for α ̸ = 0, and
Proposition 4
For every α ≥ 0, the poverty measure P α satisfies PF, PM, N, PS, RI. Moreover, P α satisfies TS and DTS for every α > 0.
The poverty measure P α , which combines the income gap function and the exponential mean, is interesting in so far as it is analytically sensitive to the value of the poverty threshold as well as to income transfers between the rich and the poor, a form of extended transfer sensitivity, see also [23] .
We can write the poverty measure as
since the n−q income gaps of the non poor are null. We can now use the fact that the exponential mean is a decomposable aggregation function, see [22] [15] [5] [25] , in order to obtain
where u p is the exponential mean of the income gaps of the poor, u p = F α (g(x p )), that is,
We can thus write the poverty measure P α as
where u = u p is the aggregated value of the income gaps of the poor and v = q/n is the headcount ratio of the poor in the income distribution x. The aggregation function f α is defined below.
Definition 14 We define the aggregation function
for α ̸ = 0, and f α=0 (u, v) = uv.
The continuity of the aggregation function with respect to the parameter α is ensured by
In the null parameter case the poverty measure reduces to P α=0 (x) = f α=0 (u, v) = uv = u p (q/n), which corresponds to the poverty measure proposed in García-Lapresta et al. [24] . The two poverty measures differ for positive values of the parameter α, in which case the poverty measure P α as in (23) breaks the u, v symmetry which is present in [24] and yields a non trivial balance between the aggregated value of the income gaps of the poor and the headcount ratio of the poor in the population.
In the new poverty measure P α as in (23) • Fig. 1 shows f α (u, v) as a function of u for two values of the variable v: v = 1/4 (group below) and v = 3/4 (group above). In each group the parameter α takes the values α = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 where α = 0 corresponds to the inferior graph and α = 4 corresponds to the superior graph in the group.
• Fig. 2 shows f α (u, v) as a function of v for two values of the variable u: u = 1/2 (group below) and u = 1 (group above). In each group the parameter α takes the values α = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 where α = 0 corresponds to the inferior graph and α = 4 corresponds to the superior graph in the group. From the interpretative point of view the parameter α tends to emphasize the convexity of the poverty measure dependence on u and thus it tends to accentuate the importance of extreme poverty levels (high u values). On the other hand the parameter α tends to emphasize the concavity of the poverty measure dependence on v and thus it tends to accentuate the effect of scarce headcount ratios (low v values).
The aggregation function f α is continuously differentiable in any order with respect to the parameter. The derivatives of f α with respect to the parameter at α = 0 can be obtained (by means of l'Hospital's rule) as follows,
just to mention the first and second order derivatives. The general form of the derivatives of f α with respect to the parameter at α = 0 is complex in its dependence on the variable v. However the roots v = 0 and v = 1 are always present in every order and the root v = 1/2 is present in even orders. In Fig. 3 we indicate all the roots numerically obtained up to order sixteen. Notice the interesting sigmoid shape of the plot due to the fact that the root density is higher in the neighbourhood of the extreme values 0 and 1.
Proposition 5
The aggregation function f α as in (24) , with parameter α ≥ 0, is strictly increasing in both variables u and v, is strictly convex in u and strictly concave in v, and overall it is neither concave nor convex. Proof : The first partial derivatives of f α with respect to the variables u and v are as follows,
and continuity in the parameter α is ensured by
The second partial derivatives are as follows,
The determinant of the Hessian matrix of the aggregation function f α is given by
which means that the quadratic form associated with the Hessian matrix is indefinite, i.e., the aggregation function is neither concave nor convex.
In relation with the balance between the variables u and v of the aggregation function f α , the points in which an increase in u is compensated by an equal decrease in v (or viceversa) are the solutions of the equation
where the curve v = h α (u), depending on the parameter α, illustrates the character of the balancing mechanism between the two variables in the context of the new poverty measure. Notice that h α=0 (u) = u as in the poverty measure proposed in [24] . Finally, the Taylor expansion of the aggregation function f α with respect to the parameter α provides further insight on the way the new poverty measure extends the one proposed in [24] . The Taylor expansion with respect to the parameter at α = 0 expresses the change in the aggregation mechanism of the poverty measure, particularly in the way it combines the two variables u and v, from the symmetric balance f α=0 (u, v) = uv as in [24] to the more complex asymmetric balance in f α (u, v) as in (24) .
In this way the Taylor expansion with respect to the parameter illustrates the effect of having extended the focus of the poverty measure by considering the full income gap distribution of the population.
Below we indicate the second order Taylor expansion with respect to the parameter at α = 0,
where the null order term in the parameter corresponds to the case f α=0 (u, v) = uv as in the poverty measure [24] . The remaining terms, • first order term u 2 v(1 − v) • second order term u 3 v(1 − v)(1 − 2v) correspond to corrections which are proportional to increasing powers of u (aggregated income gap of the poor) together with increasing order polynomials in v whose roots introduce reference values for the headcount ratio of the poor in the population.
Conclusion
We propose a poverty measure based on the exponential mean of the full income gap distribution of the population. We show that this poverty measure expresses a non trivial balance between the aggregated value of the income gaps of the poor and the headcount ratio of the poor in the population.
The new poverty measure extends a previous proposal also based on the exponential mean but with an exclusive focus on the poor sector of the income distribution.
The new poverty measure combining the income gap function and the exponential mean is interesting in so far as it is analytically sensitive to the value of the poverty threshold as well as to income transfers between the rich and the poor, a form of extended transfer sensitivity.
